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Abstract Our computational economic analysis investigates the relationship between
inequality, mobility and the financial accumulation process. Extending the baseline
model by Levy et al., we characterise the economic process through stylised return
structures generating alternative evolutions of income and wealth through time. First,
we explore the limited heuristic contribution of one and two-factors models comprising
one single stock (capital wealth) and one single flow factor (labour) as pure drivers of
income and wealth generation and allocation over time. Second, we introduce heuris-
tic modes of taxation in line with the baseline approach. Our computational economic
analysis corroborates that the financial accumulation process featuring compound
returns plays a significant role as source of inequality, while institutional arrange-
ments including taxation play a significant role in framing and shaping the aggregate
economic process that evolves over socioeconomic space and time.
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1 Introduction and literature review
Capital wealth accumulation is an evergreen matter of economic analysis and policy.1
Public finance and financial macroeconomic models define notions of production,
income and capital wealth and study their aggregated evolution over time (Bertola
et al. 2006; Blanchard 2011; Snowdon and Vane 2005), as well as their distribution
across individuals (see the survey of economic literature by Sahota 1978). In particular,
some notable efforts aim to explain empirical distributions as driven by either certain
stochastic processes, or the combined influence of driving factors such as family
environment, talent, education and social status. Recent economic modelling strategies
include Nirei and Souma (2007) and Gabaix et al. (2016).
Since the fifties, the standard representation of growth denotes a multiplicative
process that is also the standard representation for individual financial investments.
This modeling strategy implicitly assumes a single capital stock that is measured
and reinvested for the aggregate economy over time (Perroux 1949; Stone 1986).
Recent advances in dynamic macroeconomic modelling, based upon the representa-
tive agent hypothesis, have been criticized for disregarding the aggregate dimension
featured by collective and dynamic phenomena (Gallegati and Kirman 1999). Previ-
ously neglected, issues of income and wealth distributions have gained socioeconomic
momentum in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2008, including
through the 99% movement in US (Haldane et al. 2014; Alvaredo et al. 2013). This
movement claims that the increased financialisation of economy and society involves
an increased appropriation of income and wealth by the richest 1% of the population
at detriment of the remaining 99%, leading to more unequal and allegedly unfair dis-
tributions of income and wealth. This distributional issue renewed theoretical interest
through influential positions taken by leading economists (Krugman 2013, 2014a, b;
Stiglitz 2012; Solow 2014) and policy-makers (Haldane 2014)), as well as through the
publication of economic history studies conducted by Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel
Saez among others, reconstructing long-run statistical time series of income and wealth
distributions in US and abroad (Atkinson et al. 2011; Piketty 2014; Piketty and Saez
2014).
According to Haldane et al. (2014), “as ever, dispute rages about the precise statis-
tics. But the long-term patterns are clear enough–and remarkable. Almost half of the
growth in US national income between 1975 and 2007 accrued to the top 1% (OECD
2014). In the UK and US, the top 1%’s share of the income pie has more than doubled
since 1980 to around 15% and their share of the wealth pie has been estimated at
1 Hereafter, the term “capital wealth” combines concepts of capital and wealth to stress the productive
nature of wealth considered by our economic analysis. Indeed, we especially point to financial investments,
while durable assets held for consumption are excluded from our analysis.
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up to a third–more than the whole bottom half of the population put together (ONS
2013; Wolff 2012). The five richest households in the UK have greater wealth than
the bottom fifth of the population (Oxfam 2014)”.2
The theoretical issue of income and wealth distributions is well-known since classic
economic theorists in the XIX century at least, when the leading economist Mill (1861)
considered “fair and reasonable that the general policy of the State should favour the
diffusion rather than the concentration of wealth.” At the beginning of the XX cen-
tury, the leading economist and sociologist Pareto (1895, 1965, 1897a, b) argued for
the so-called Pareto (power-law) wealth distribution as an empirical regularity, while
the economic statistician Gini (1912) developed ingenious statistical measurement
techniques to capture this inequality through the so-called Gini index.3
Recent advances in econophysics point to the functional forms of statistical distribu-
tions of income and wealth (Lux 2005). In particular, some scholars aim to reproduce
empirical regularities through simple, elegant additive economic processes (Angle
2006; Richmond and Solomon 2001; Solomon and Richmond 2002). Other scholars
purport to explain the fat tail of these distributions (that is, the tail concerned with
the higher ranges of aggregate income and wealth) through multiplicative economic
processes which lead to emerging power-laws (Levy 2005; Levy and Levy 2003;
Milakovic 2003). Some recent contributions suggest the form of a deformed expo-
nential function, which seems to capture well the empirical regularities of income
distribution at the low-middle range, as well as its power-law tail (Kaniadakis 2001,
2002). These modelling attempts have raised a lively debate with some economists
who were worrying about allegedly poor socioeconomic understanding and lack of
theoretical economic underpinnings (Gallegati et al. 2006; Lux 2005). Further collab-
orative and interdisciplinary research has developed the application of the k-deformed
exponential function to the parametric modelling of personal income and wealth dis-
tributions (Clementi and Gallegati 2015, 2017; Clementi et al. 2007, 2008, 2009;
Clementi et al 2010; Clementi et al. 2012a, b, 2016). The latter approach provides
insights on the drivers of these distributions over time and across the population,
while enabling synthetic comparison through inequality and poverty measures that
are derived from parametric estimations.
In this context, generalising Champernowne (1953), Levy (2005) and Levy and
Levy (2003) (Levy et al. thereafter) have developed an elegant modelling strategy
purporting to explain the power-law tail of income and wealth distributions under
financial market efficiency, and the stochastic distribution of financial returns across
individuals active in this market.
In sum, theoretical and societal attention paid to the economic inequality issue
raises the question of the cause of this inequality. Whichever tentative response to this
question has profound socioeconomic implications, raising further theoretical and
applied concerns which go beyond the functional form of statistical distributions of
2 See also CBO (2011).
3 Literature on the Pareto (power-law) distribution of wealth is too vast to be summarized here and outside
the purpose and scope of this article, which is not concerned with the statistical form of wealth distribution.
Further readings include: Kirman (1987), Dagum (1990), Dra˘gulescu and Yakovenko (2001) and Persky
(1992).
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income and wealth across individuals. From this broader perspective, our contribution
purports to address two featuring dimensions:
(i) the inequality of income and wealth allocation across individuals, and its evolution
over time;
(ii) the significance of collective institutional mechanisms, including taxation, that
actively frame and shape this economic process.
In particular, our modelling strategy consists in extending and improving on exist-
ing literature by considering these two dimensions. Levy et al. provide a convenient
baseline model which subsumes the basic assumptions which characterise widespread
economic modelling on these matters. Fernholz and Fernholz (2014) and Bertola et al.
(2006) review and develop more sophisticated models that maintain similar back-
ground assumptions. In this context, Levy et al. have the advantage to reduce the
model structure to its minimal, synthetic, and simple formulation. By elaborating on
the Levy et al. model, our computational economic analysis will show the relevance
of the financial accumulation process that features compound return investment over
time. This peculiar accumulation process explains qualitatively both the increasing
inequality across individuals, and the decreasing social mobility empirically observed
in recent decades.
The rest of the article is organised as follows. The second section introduces a finan-
cial accumulation process model inspired by the Levy et al. model, as baseline scenario.
The third section shows the implications of this model for the evolution of inequality
and social mobility through time, assessing their sensitivity to changes in variance and
non-normal distribution of returns. The fourth section extends the baseline model by
introducing decreasing returns and the simple return structure. The comparison with
this latter structure corroborates that, without financial accumulation, inequality is not
increased over time in the baseline scenario. The fifth section introduces a second flow
factor (labour income) along with the stock factor (capital wealth) considered by Levy
et al. The introduction of a flow factor may involve an income-saving process that
complements and integrates the financial accumulation process driven by inherited
wealth. All together, the analysis developed in the first five sections makes clear that
distributional effects, which depend on aggregate configurations, have been neglected
by the received literature. This preliminary conclusion paves the way to introducing
minimal institutions (à la Shubik) that denote collective mechanisms related to income
and wealth distributions. In particular, the sixth section introduces simple centralised
modes of taxation, featuring a proportional taxation model (proportional taxation of
periodic net income, uniformly redistributed through provision of universal public ser-
vice), and a progressive taxation model (progressive taxation of periodic net income,
redistributed in a regressive way through direct transfers). A summary of main results
concludes.
2 Modelling strategy for the financial accumulation process
Levy et al. develop a simple model of aggregate economic process based upon one
stock factor (wealth) generating a pure compound rate of return ri,t stochastically
distributed across individuals and time periods. This model captures the Pareto law
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shape in the high-wealth (and high-income) range of the aggregate distributions, where
“changes in wealth are mainly due to financial investment, and are, therefore, typically
multiplicative” (Levy 2005, p. 105). This modelling strategy is based on a stochastic
multiplicative process of wealth accumulation with lower bound on wealth and homo-
geneous financial investment talent. According to the authors, this framework implies
that “the only reason for inequality is the stochastic process - chance. This implies
that there is no differential ability in asset selection or in timing the [financial] market,
which is in line with the efficient-market hypothesis. [...] Homogeneous accumulation
of talent means that all investors draw their returns randomly from the same distri-
bution (the realized return, however, generally differs from one investor to another)”
(Levy and Levy 2003, p. 709 and 711).4 We formalise the Levy et al. model of financial
economic process through the familiar structure of compound returns. Thus, wealth
Wt+1 of agent i at time t + 1 is computed as:
Wi,t+1 = (1 + ri,t )Wi,t for r ≥ −1 (1)
or equivalently:
Wi,T = Wi,1
T∏
t=1
(1 + ri,t ) (2)
where each individual i draws his actual return ri,t at time t from the same statisti-
cal distribution defined as follows: ri,t ∼ N (μr , σr ) with μr , σr > 0. We take σr
sufficiently large to enable the possibility of financial investment losses. Contrary to
Levy et. al, our model does not include a reflective lower bound on minimum wealth.
This lower boundary would introduce an implicitly redistributive process in the base-
line scenario, while we prefer restricting it to pure financial accumulation. Moreover,
Levy et al. require the reflective lower bound in order to obtain the power-law distri-
bution of wealth. The statistical form of wealth distribution is outside the purpose and
scope of our article, which focuses instead on the relationship between the financial
accumulation process, inequality and social mobility.
In the degenerated case with r constant, the Eq. 2 becomes the classic formula of
compound returns over time:
WT = W1(1 + r)T (3)
where for −1 ≤ r < 0 : Wt →t 0 and for r > 0 : Wt →t +∞.
This stylised model does not pretend to reproduce economic reality in its totality.
In particular, it does not introduce consumption, overlapping generations, or windfall
gains and losses due to wars or accidents. However, it captures one featuring element
of the aggregate economic process: financial accumulation opportunities. Compound
4 In fact, Levy (2005) (chapter, p. 111, footnote 13) concedes that even joint accumulation processes with
heterogeneous accumulation of talents are asymptotically Paretian, with the faster-increasing multiplicative
process dominating the high-range in the long run. Fernholz and Fernholz (2014) maintain that, in their
model, “luck alone - in the form of high realised investment returns - [...] creates divergent levels of wealth.”
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returns feature financial investment dynamics and related institutions. Financial insti-
tutions, such as investment funds, and widespread measures of financial performance
are based upon compound return as reference logic. It seems then particularly sig-
nificant to disentangle and analyse its impact. The aggregate economic process is
increasingly managed through corporate forms that live indefinitely and can then go
on performing financial accumulation. On the one hand, financial investment is con-
ducted by institutional investors which are driven by, and assessed against, compound
return. On the other hand, eventual redistribution of their financial proceeds is often
received by corporate recipients that go on reinvesting those proceeds over time, in a
self-referential financial accumulation dynamics.
Throughout all our computational analysis, we assume an initial equal distribution
of wealth Wi,t=1 = 10 ∀ i across all individuals at initial time t = 1. This implies that
inequality depends entirely on the specifications of the economic process. Furthermore,
for sake of simulation, we impose the same random seed to all the various sets of
simulations proposed in this article. When not mentioned otherwise, we also define a
population of N = 5000, and we run every simulation round for tmax = 5000 steps.5
Contrary to Levy et al., we allow the theoretical possibility that individual wealth falls
to, and remains at zero level. Individual agents take financial investment risk and may
occasionally lose all their capital wealth.6
Our computational economic analysis disentangles two featuring dimensions to be
analysed: wealth inequality across individuals, and social mobility relative to wealth
dimension.
Wealth inequality is captured through the Gini Index Gt which summarises the
relative concentration of wealth across individuals at a certain period of time t , defined
as follows:
Gt =
[
(N + 1) − 2
(∑N
k=1(N + 1 − k)wk,t∑N
k=1 wk,t
)]
1
N − 1 with 0 ≤ Gt ≤ 1 (4)
where N is the number of individuals and wk,t ≤ wk+1,t denotes the ranked vector
of Wi,t at time t . Accordingly, Gt → 0 when individual wealths become more equal,
while Gt → 1 when richer individuals tend to acquire a larger share of aggregate
wealth. In order to further corroborate the results obtained observing the Gini Index,
we also study other measures of inequality such as the Theil index; the absolute and
relative share of income by the top 1% of the population; and the evolution of the
proportion of wealth appropriated by different deciles of wealth. All these measures
qualitatively confirm the results, and are thus relegated to supplementary material.
Concerning wealth mobility, our Weighted Mobility Index Mt denotes the relative
change in wealth position by agent i between two adjacent time periods t − 1 and t .
5 The Matlab code of the simulations can be found at: https://github.com/simonerighi/BiondiRighi2018_
JEIC.
6 For simulation purpose, we calibrate the parameter space to make this possibility unlikely. In the scenarios
presented in this article, despite the high number of iterations, no agent ever loses its wealth completely.
Agents experience partial losses (negative returns), but no complete loss of their wealth.
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We consider the average of this index across individuals at each period t . Weighted
Mobility Index Mt is computed as follows:
Mt = 1N
N∑
i=1
[ |Dec [W j
]
i,t−1 − Dec
[
W j
]
i,t |
Dec
[
W j=1
]
t − Dec
[
W j=10
]
t
]
(5)
where Dec
[
W j
]
i,t represents the median wealth at time t for the decile j in which
agent i was at time t , while
[
W j=1
]
t and
[
W j=10
]
t denote respectively the median
wealth for the first and the last decile at time t . This index captures the relative move-
ment of the individual i whenever he moves across deciles, relative to the maximum
wealth distance between the first and the last decile. By taking its mean for each period
across the population N , we denote the average wealth-weighted individual capacity
to move across deciles period after period. Again, in order to corroborate the results
obtained with this indicator, we test other measures of mobility. These additional mea-
sures confirm the deductions that can be inferred from Mt and are thus relegated to
supplementary material.
3 The baseline case
The dynamics of wealth concentration across individuals over time is impressive under
the baseline scenario introduced by Levy et al. Wealth distributions become increas-
ingly skewed under various compound return structures where individual returns are
extracted from normal and gamma distributions at each period of time. For all these
structures, the upper tail of wealth distribution goes on appropriating an increas-
ing share of aggregate wealth over time. This dynamic effect has implications for
wealth inequality (Fig. 1). In particular, the Gini Index shows that wealth inequality
is magnified under the baseline case, asymptotically tending to its maximal value of
one. Drawing upon Fernholz and Fernholz (2014)’ proof, we introduce the following
Lemma 1 concerned with the evolution of time-average wealth distribution:
Lemma 1 The asymptotic value of a Gini Index based upon time-average wealth
tends almost surely to its maximum value of one.
Proof See Appendix 7.1.
Following Biondi and Olla (2018), we further introduce the following lemma con-
cerned with the Gini Index across the population at each point of time:
Lemma 2 The asymptotic value of the Gini Index Gt on the entire population at a
certain point of time t asymptotically tends almost surely to its maximum value of one.
Proof See Proof of Lemma 3.1 in Biondi and Olla (2018).
Furthermore, as shown more systematically by Fig. 2, the Gini Index is increasing
in the variance of the underlying return structure. This concentration effect could be
counterbalanced by social mobility relative to wealth, involving the actual capacity
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Fig. 1 Left panel: Gini Index (Eq. 4) over time periods for wealth distribution among 5000 individuals
under various return structures: ri,t ∼ N (μr , σr ) and gamma(a, b). The Gini Index asymptotically tends to
one (see Appendix 7.1). Right panel: Moving average over ten periods of Weighted Mobility Index defined
in Eq. 5. The index is computed under various return structures : ri,t ∼ N (μr , σr ) and gamma(a, b).
Averages and standard deviations are computed out of 100 simulations. In all simulations initial wealth
Wi,t=0 = 10 ∀i
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Fig. 2 Left panel: Gini Index Gt (Eq. 4) value at time tmax = 5000 under baseline return structure
ri,t ∼ N (μr , σr ). Right panel: Weighted Mobility Index value at time tmax = 5000, as defined in Eq. 5.
The index is computed under the baseline return structure : ri,t ∼ N (μr , σr ). Both panels: Values taken
by μr are represented on the vertical axis, values taken by σr are represented on the horizontal axis. In all
simulations, initial wealth Wi,t=0 = 10 ∀i
of individuals to move across the wealth distribution through time. However, our
simulations show that this is not the case for the baseline scenario. Indeed, the Wealth
Mobility Index Mt shows that wealth mobility is rapidly decreasing both over time
(Fig. 1, Right panel) and in the variance of returns (Fig. 2, Right panel).
Our result on wealth mobility is further reinforced observing the mobility of the 1%
richest individuals at different points of time. This experiment is visualized in Fig. 3.
Having ranked all the agents according to their wealth at one period t , the top 1% is
selected. Ranks are normalized by dividing values for the total number of agents so to
establish a measure that is independent of population size. In the Left panel (Fig. 3),
we compute the average position of each selected agent (that is, those included in the
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Fig. 3 This computational analysis captures the chance for agents that are the richest at a certain point of
time to remain among the richest throughout further periods. Indicators compare their relative position in
the wealth distribution across periods of reference. Left panel: Distribution of average normalized ranking
of agents belonging to the top 1% at certain periods of time. Right panel: Evolution of average normalized
ranking of agents belonging to the top 1% at certain periods of time as function of time since that period.
For both panels N = 20000. The simulations are computed under the baseline return structure with ri,t ∼
N (0.05, 0.05), while initial wealth Wi,t=0 = 10 ∀i
top 1% at period t) over the following 1000 periods. We then show the distribution of
probability of this average rank position.7 The farther is the time period t at which the
selection of the top 1% is made, the lower is the average rank position for those top
individuals. This implies a decreasing downward mobility and increasing persistence
of the top 1% over time. Moreover, Fig. 3 (Right panel) shows the evolution of the
average rank of individuals in the top 1% at time t over the next 1000 periods. As
time passes, richest individuals at a given period t tend to remain among the richest.
Indeed, while individuals that are among the richest at t = 10, 100 may yet revert
to some lower position over time (being replaced by previously poorer individuals),
individuals that are rich at t = 1000, 2000 tend to remain in the top decile of the
wealth distribution. Finally, individuals that are rich at t = 3000, 4000 tend to remain
in the top centile of wealth over time, thus perpetuating their social position relative
to wealth.
Both results for wealth inequality and wealth mobility depend especially on returns
variance (Fig. 2). Coeteris paribus, Gini Index is increasing and Wealth Mobility Index
is decreasing in return variance σr under normally distributed return structures (Fig. 4,
Left panel). Interestingly, under our baseline case, increased wealth inequality does not
depend on mis-alignement between average individual financial returns and aggregate
growth. As expected (Fig. 4, Right panel), average aggregate growth remains in line
with average individual return in our baseline case.
The sensitivity to return variance in the baseline case is magnified by financial mar-
ket dynamics. Empirical evidence for financial markets behaviour shows that actual
market price and return series are not normally distributed, featuring fat tails and
7 The time average of rank positions reduces the impact of idiosyncratic oscillations. Similar results are
obtained by replacing the average rank positions with the individual positions after 1000 periods.
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Fig. 4 Relationship between average aggregate growth and conditions of individual returns. Aggregate
Growth is defined by Eq. 11 while mean individual return is μr and the standard deviation of individual
returns is σr . By assumption, returns are dispersed according to the normal distribution ri,t ∼ N (μr , σr ), in
the baseline case, while initial wealth Wi,t=0 = 10 ∀i . Values taken by μr ∈ [0.02; 0.08] (with incremental
steps of 0.01) are represented on the vertical axis, while values taken by σr ∈ [0.02; 0.08] (with incremental
steps of 0.01) are represented on the horizontal axis
extreme events (Mandelbrot 1963, 1967; Mantegna and Stanley 1996; Biondi and
Righi 2016, 2017, providing further references). For sake of simulation, we comple-
ment normal distribution of returns with a gamma distribution having the same mean
as in the baseline case, but featuring extreme events, i.e., gamma(a, b) with a = 0.25
and b = 0.2 where a · b = μr = 0.05 and a · b2 = σr = 0.01. This parameterization
for the gamma distribution is applied to all our simulation analyses, when not stated
otherwise. Computational results show that the gamma distribution of returns rein-
forces wealth concentration and inequality, while undermining wealth mobility over
time. In particular, the Gini Index is always superior at each period of time (Fig. 2, Left
panel), while the Wealth Mobility Index is always inferior (Fig. 2, Right panel). This
result foreshadows that the non-normality of financial market returns may have an
inequality-enhancing impact, favouring skewed accumulation of wealth across indi-
viduals and over time.
4 Decreasing compound returns and simple return structures: History
matters
Levy et al. insist on the stochastic nature of their financial investment process. Our
computational economic analysis further points to its cumulative nature over time,
depending on the peculiar deployment of compound returns. Along with stochastic
extraction of the actual return r for investor i at each time t , the financial investment
process is further featured by the cumulative impact of the individual series of com-
pound returns on accumulated wealth through historical time (Fig. 1). A quick glance
at the deterministic reduction of the process model in Eq. 2 shows that being richer at
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time t almost assures becoming richer at a further time t + n with n 	 0. Coeteris
paribus, this evolutionary structure tends to favour investors that become richer ear-
lier in time, that is, investors that accumulate net gains before (and net losses after)
the others, since every gain compounds positively, while every loss compounds neg-
atively through time. This cumulative process is exacerbated by the constant mean
return to wealth which was assumed in the baseline scenario. Therefore, rather than
‘being lucky’, this process denotes that ‘history matters’. This financial accumulation
process has important implications for the evolution of wealth through socioeconomic
space and time. In a similar vein, Keynes (1933) would “trace the beginnings of
British foreign investment to the treasure which Drake stole from Spain in 1580”,
reinvested at annual compound return of 3.25% over the next centuries to 1930, while
remembering its connection to “avarice and usury and precaution that must be our
gods for a little longer still [... to] lead us out of the tunnel of economic necessity
into daylight”. Hysteresis and path dependency play an important role in explaining
the inequality generated by the financial accumulation process. Wealth concentration
is ever-increasing over time (Fig. 1), while relative social mobility is undermined
by increasing differences in total wealth,8 as showed by the Wealth Mobility Index
(Fig. 2). In sum, idiosyncratic compound returns on investment through time prove to
have cumulative effects, making the aggregate distribution of wealth not stationary.
In particular, this distribution becomes increasingly right-skewed over time, tending
to a limit in which wealth is concentrated entirely at the top (see also Fernholz and
Fernholz 2014; Biondi and Olla 2018). This right-skewed tail of wealth distribution
depends especially on the second order of return distributions at a certain time period
t (that is, the variance σr in case of returns that are normally distributed).
This section further assesses the relationship between wealth inequality and mobil-
ity and the evolution of returns through time. A first extension consists in exploring
alternative economic processes characterised by decreasing returns to wealth. For
simulation purposes, decreasing returns to aggregate wealth can be introduced by
imposing an external constraint on all the returns ri,t as follows:
(1 + ri,t ) = 1 + ri,tlog(1 + T Wt ) ∀t > 1 (6)
where
T Wt =
N∑
i=1
Wi,t (7)
Accordingly, all actual returns ri,t ∀i, t decrease in proportion to aggregate wealth,
which is positive and increasing on average over time by assumption. Possible and
actual net gains and losses are then progressively reduced over time. Under our baseline
assumptions, they tend to zero in the long run, that is, 1 + ri,t → 1 for t → +∞.
Decreasing returns are relevant here to test the sensitivity of wealth inequality and
8 Levy and Levy (2003, p. 7) prove that “the actual wealth distribution converges to a Pareto distribution
[. . . ] with minimum wealth, average wealth, and variance that grow over time” when a lower bound on
minimum wealth is introduced. Without the latter, the distribution converges to a non-stationary log-normal
distribution.
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Fig. 5 Left panel: Comparison of Gini Index over time under constant and decreasing returns to aggregate
wealth. Right panel: Comparison of Weighted Mobility Index Mt over time under constant and decreasing
returns to aggregate wealth. Averages and standard deviations are computed out of 100 simulations. In
both panels and configurations: the simulations are computed under the baseline return structure with
ri,t ∼ N (0.05, 0.05), and initial wealth Wi,t=0 = 10 ∀i . Under decreasing returns ri,t are modified
according to Eq. 6
mobility to time. In addition, positive constant returns are not a reasonable hypothesis
asymptotically, where constraints on growth, as well as limits in natural and human
resources, typically appear. Decreasing returns may also denote the case of absent or
decaying technological development.
Computational results show that wealth inequality is materially reduced, while
wealth mobility is improved under decreasing returns. In particular, Gini Index is
consistently lower across time, while Weighted Mobility Index, although decreasing,
remains asymptotically superior over time, relative to the baseline case (Fig. 5). There-
fore, individuals are always less unequal and more able to move across wealth relative
levels in this scenario, relative to the baseline case. Decreasing returns over time pro-
gressively reduce the opportunity by individuals to gain or lose from their wealth
investment and accumulation. Therefore, individuals do not have sufficient occasions
to accumulate wealth over time, both in absolute and relative terms. Decreasing returns
reshape both the first and the second order of return distribution, reducing both the
total wealth and its dispersion across individuals over time. This result shows that
wealth inequality and mobility depend on temporal evolution of returns.
This preliminary conclusion is corroborated by analysing simple return structure,
which further allows to investigate the distinctive impact of the cumulative dimension
of the baseline economic process. Simple return constitutes a reference logic which is
diametrically opposite to compound return. It heuristically corresponds to the ‘finan-
cial capital maintenance’ rule that is applied by corporate accounting systems. This
rule computes the maintenance of invested shareholder equity from one period to the
next one. The net difference is then reported as net earnings that can be distributed
to shareholders (if positive), the undistributed part being accounted for as retained
earnings. At the microeconomic level, simple return means that only net wealth is
reinvested over time, while eventual net gains are consumed period after period. This
heuristically corresponds to investing the same nominal amount in bonds and gilts
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Fig. 6 Left panel: Gini Index over time under simple return structure with normal distribution
N (μr , σr ) = N (0.05; 0.05), and under simple return structure with Gamma distribution gamma(a, b) =
gamma(0.25; 0.2). The Gini Index asymptotically tends to zero (see Appendix 7.2). Right panel: Moving
average of Weighted Mobility Index under simple return structure with normal distribution N (μr , σr ) =
N (0.05; 0.05), and simple return structure with Gamma distribution gamma(a, b) = gamma(0.25; 0.2).
Averages and standard deviations are computed out of 100 simulations. In all cases, initial wealth
Wi,t=0 = 10∀i
repeatedly, without reinvesting proceeds through time (Biondi 2011). At the macroe-
conomic level, simple return may correspond to a capital formation process that is
stationary and constrained over reinvestment. Capital stock is then reproduced rather
than accumulated, its net contribution to total income being consummated over time.
Under simple return structure, financial capital is remunerated as productive factor but
it is not financially accumulated over time. It is then treated as a flow factor (becoming
analogous to labor in this respect), involving full consumption of all the net positive
proceeds generated by capital wealth at each period of time. Formally:
Wi,T = Wi,1
(
1 +
T∑
t=1
ri,t
)
with ri,t ≥ −1 ∀ i, t (8)
For sake of simulation, we compute actual simple returns under two return struc-
tures: N (μr , σr ) and gamma(a, b). Computational results (Fig. 6) show that wealth
inequality does not accumulate under simple return structures, while wealth mobility
remains virtually constant over time. Individuals go on adding their profits and losses
to the initial invested capital, without reinvesting the proceeds. Asymptotically, those
profits and losses compensate each other because they are generated by an additive
stochastic process applied over the same initial amount. In particular, the Gini Index is
decreasing and asymptotically near to zero, while the Wealth Mobility Index remains
asymptotically higher than the baseline case. In Appendix 7.2, we analytically prove
the following Lemma (as visualised by simulations in Fig. 6):
Lemma 3 The Gini Index Gt tends asymptotically to 0 for t → ∞, under simple
return structure, implying perfect equality among individuals.
Therefore, wealth inequality proves to be crucially dependent on the accumulation
of returns through time, while this accumulation further undermines social mobility as
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expressed by relative levels of wealth. In sum, the economic process modelled by Levy
et al. denotes a significant connection between inequality and the financial accumu-
lation process. This accumulation through time proves to be conducive to increased
wealth inequality and decreased wealth mobility over historical time. However, its
assumption of constant average returns to aggregate wealth under compound return
structure seems unsustainable, because indefinite compounding cannot realistically
hold in the long-run (Voinov and Farley 2007; Biondi 2011). Moreover, IMF studies
(Berg and Osrty 2013; Ostry et al. 2014) show that inequality affects growth, with
higher inequality being associated with lower growth. It seems then unrealistic to
assume a structurally stable economic process while the upper wealth tail goes on
appropriating an ever-increasing part of total wealth, with the Gini Index asymptoti-
cally reaching the maximum value of one in the long-run. However, our model clearly
shows the logical and institutional tensions between the multiplicative logic embedded
in compound return, and this potential trade-off between inequality and growth. Let
alone, such a multiplicative process may involve a self-fulfilling decrease in returns,
reducing then social welfare.
In order to extend this one-factor model, the next section shall introduce a two-
factors model of the economic process, adding a flow factor which features an additive
evolution to the stock factor characterised by a cumulative evolution through time.
5 A model of aggregate economic process combining capital wealth
(stock) and labour (flow) factors
According to Oulton (1976), policy attitudes towards the inequality of wealth depend
on views of its two paradigmatic causes. Accordingly, wealth inequality can be
explained either “because income was unequally distributed and hence some people
saved more, in consequence accumulating more wealth”, or because wealth inheritance
(accumulation) through time. Textbook macroeconomics introduces a stylised eco-
nomic process that combines both economic factors: one stock factor (capital wealth)
and another flow factor (labour). In this context, the Cobb-Douglas is a classic pro-
duction function for the aggregate economy, featuring factor returns to scale in its
parameter space. Extending the baseline model by Levy et al., a second flow factor
can be introduced as follows. Total income comprises the sum of wealth income and
labour income as follows:
Y Ti,T = Y Wi,T + Y Li,T (9)
Labour income can be consumed (for a share 1 − si,t ) or saved (for a share si,t ) at
every period t . Total wealth comprises then accumulated wealth at compound returns
and cumulated saved income as follows:
W SU Mi,T = Wi,t=1
T∏
t=1
(1 + ri,t ) +
∑
i,T
(si,t · Y Li,t ) (10)
with ri,t ≥ −1 denoting pure wealth yield and 0 ≤ si,t < 1 denoting saving share.
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In this context, total wealth growth can be defined as follows:
Growtht = T Wt − T Wt−1T Wt−1 (11)
where T Wt applies Eq. 7 to W SU Mi,T defined in Eq. 10. For sake of generality and
comparability, we introduce a fair condition between capital wealth yields and the
labour income savings by setting the initial capital wealth so that it yields a weighted-
mean permanent rent equal to the weighted-mean saved income at each period of
time t . For this purpose, the perpetual rent value (to be equaled with the initial capital
wealth) is computed as the ratio between the period rent income and its period return
rate.
According to our configuration, the wealth return ri,t defines the wealth yield Y Wi,t =
ri,t Wi,t−1. The fair condition imposes that this wealth income is equal, on average, to
the saved income of the period. The latter is defined as Y Li,t = si,t Y Lt .
Accordingly, the fair condition imposes that:
Wt=1 ≡
∑N
i=1(si,t · Y Li,t )∑N
i=1(ri,t )
(12)
Under this condition, our parameter space does not introduce any bias between the
respective period incomes generated by the two factors on average (Fig. 7). At the
onset, both factors contribute, on average, equally to total income.
On this basis, we introduce labour income and savings with the same logic which
Levy et al. apply to capital wealth. We introduce a stochastic saving rate si,t ∈ [0, 1]
for which:
(i) all saving rates are equally likely, and
(ii) the average saving rate is always equal for all the individuals.
Fig. 7 Time evolution of the
share of wealth generated by
labour income and
labour-income savings.
Averages and standard
deviations are computed out of
100 simulations. See Sect. 5 for
details about the simulation
conditions
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Fig. 8 Left panel: Gini Index value over time under baseline case (one-factor model), two-factors model
without labor-income savings, and two-factors model with reinvested savings over time. Right panel: Moving
average of Weighted Mobility Index under baseline case (one-factor model), two-factors model without labor
income savings, and two-factors model with reinvested savings over time. Averages and standard deviations
are computed out of 100 simulations. In all cases, initial wealth Wi,t=0 = 10 ∀i
Under these assumptions, taking Y Li,t = 1 and si,t ∼ U [0, 1] ∀i, t and recalling that:
1
N
∑N
i=1(si,t Y Li,t ) = smean ≡ 0.5 while 1N
∑N
i=1(ri,t ) = μr ≡ 0.05, the fair condition
imposes Wt=1 ≡ 0.50.05 = 10, consistently with our assumption for initial wealth
Wi,t=1 = 10, for all individuals.
Our computational analysis shows that the presence of a labor factor does not
reshape the baseline economic process concerning wealth inequality and mobility. In
particular, either if labour income cannot be saved (that is, si,t = 0 ∀i, t), or if savings
cannot be reinvested (as in the previous Eq. 10), the additive process of labour factor
cannot match the multiplicative process of wealth accumulation. Consequently, the
latter continues to dominate the aggregate economic process in the long run. Wealth
inequality and mobility are not reshaped by the presence of that additive factor (Fig. 8).
Labour income alone cannot reshape wealth concentration, inequality and mobility
dynamics through time. Nevertheless, some may wonder whether reinvested savings
from labour income could. To test this hypothesis, we introduce a progressive wealth
accumulation driven by labour income savings. Formally:
Wi,t+1 = Wi,t (1 + ri,t ) + (si,t+1Y Li,t+1) (13)
In this case, the saved share of labour income Y Li is progressively accumulated through
compound returns along with inherited wealth across individuals and over time. Total
individual wealth through time includes both saved wealth and inherited wealth, for-
mally:
W SU Mi,t+1 = W1
t∏
h=1
(1 + ri,h) +
t+1∑
j=1
si, j Y Li, j
t∏
k= j
(1 + ri,k) (14)
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If labor income remains constant over time, i.e. Y Li,t = Y0 ∀i, t , this formula reduces
to:
W SU Mi,t+1 = W1
t∏
h=1
(1 + ri,h) + Y0
t+1∑
j=1
si, j
t∏
k= j
(1 + ri,k) (15)
In Eq. 15, we maintain that ri,h (returns over inherited wealth) have the same structure
as ri,k (returns over accumulated savings). For sake of simulation, we continue to
assume Y0 = 1 ∀i, t .
According to our computational results (Fig. 8), even this progressive reinvestment
of savings cannot reshape wealth inequality and mobility under the fair condition
stated above. Wealth distributions and all the indexes maintain the same behaviour as
under the baseline case.9
Although each individual draws savings from labour income according to a uniform
distribution, these savings are reinvested according to the same financial accumula-
tion process as the inherited wealth, which is initially equal for all agents. Therefore,
savings from labour income do not introduce an alternative reference logic or a com-
plementary economic process. Consequently, they cannot reshape wealth distribution,
inequality and mobility over time.
In sum, under both the Levy et al. model and the widespread two-factors model of
the aggregate economic process, wealth concentration, inequality and mobility depend
crucially on the compound return structure that characterises the accumulation of
financial investment over time. The decomposition of wealth dynamics in two factors
of productions does not change its evolution over time.
In fact, our computational results further show emerging aggregate behaviour that
proves distant from economic reality, echoing the Knight (1938, p. 81)’s claim that:
The entire notion of ‘factor of production’ is an incubus on economic analysis,
and should be eliminated from economic discussion as summarily as possible.
In a similar vein, Solow (1976, p. 138) acknowledged the aggregation problem as
follows:
I have to insist again that anyone who reads my 1955 article [Solow (1955)] will
see that I invoke the formal conditions for rigorous aggregation not in the hope
that they would be applicable [. . .] but rather to suggest the hopelessness of any
formal justification of an aggregate production function in capital and labor.
Nevertheless, our computational analysis shed some light on theoretical and applied
implications that are implicitly assumed in widespread representations and models of
the aggregate economic process, as reviewed and further developed by Fernholz and
Fernholz (2014) and Bertola et al. (2006) among others. From this perspective, the
following section shall expand upon our preliminary conclusions about inequality,
mobility and the financial accumulation process. We shall introduce a stylised institu-
tional configuration that typically frames and shapes income and wealth dynamics in
economy and society: taxation.
9 The same results hold when actual returns are derived from simple return structure. Computational results
are available under request.
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6 The impact of taxation and redistribution
Taxation is a classic matter related to income and wealth distributions. Available
statistics do extensively rely upon fiscal data for gathering evidence (Saez and Zucman
2014; Topritzhofer et al. 1970). It is then interesting to explore its effect on wealth
concentration, inequality and mobility by expanding the baseline model by Levy et
al. through featured modes of taxation.
For simulation purpose, we introduce four stylised modes of taxation, all governed
by a central authority that knows and intervenes over the individual positions of wealth
and income (change in wealth) at the end of each period. Four modes of taxation
combine two methods of tax levy with two methods of tax distribution:
– Concerning tax levy, we assume either a uniform proportional tax rate for all
individuals (uniform taxation), or a progressive tax rate increasing with the tax
base (progressive taxation).
– Concerning tax distribution, we assume either a uniform redistribution to all
individuals (featuring the provision of universal public service), or a regressive
redistribution that decreases with the tax base (featuring provision of direct trans-
fers for welfare to the polity).
Under proportional taxation and public service model (Proportional and PS), the
tax authority levies a fixed universal share τi,t = τ ∀ i, t on positive net changes
in wealth Ti,t = max
{
Wi,t − Wi,t−1; 0
}
, and redistributes the total levied amount
equally among all the individuals. This model features the provision of public services
to the polity through proportional taxation as follows:
T axi,t = Ti,tτ ; (16)
Subsidyi,t =
∑
k T axk,t
N
(17)
Under proportional taxation and welfare model (Proportional and Welfare), the tax
authority employs the proportional tax levy to provide direct transfers to the polity.
These transfers are redistributed in regressive proportion to individual wealth. Individ-
ual tax is computed according to Eq. 16, while the redistribution is managed according
to the following formula:
Subsidyi,t =
[
1 − Ti,t∑N
k=1 Tk,t
]
1
N − 1
∑
k
T axk,t (18)
Under progressive taxation and public service model (Progressive and PS), the
tax authority levies a progressive share Ti,t of net changes in wealth. Accordingly, the
richest individual applies the maximum rate τmax = τi,t (max T ) ∀t , while the poorest
individual does not pay anything. On this basis, the tax authority provides a universal
public service to all the individuals. Individual tax payment is defined as follows:
T axi,t = Ti,t · τmax Ti,t − min Ti,t
max Ti,t − min Ti,t (19)
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Table 1 Stylised modes of taxation and redistribution
Tax Redistribution Proportional Regressive
Tax Levy Redistribution Rate Redistribution Rate
Proportional tax rate Proportional taxation and public service Proportional taxation and welfare
Progressive tax rate Progressive taxation and public service Progressive taxation and welfare
On this basis, the individual i having the maximal tax base Ti,t applies the maximal
tax rate τmax , while the individual i having the minimal tax base Ti,t does not pay
taxes (i.e., its tax rate τi,t = 0 at time period t). The redistribution mechanism under
this model follows Eq. 17.
Finally, under progressive taxation and welfare model (Progressive and Welfare),
the tax authority employs the tax levy denoted by Eq. 19 in order to redistribute the
total levied amount in a regressive proportion to wealth, according to Eq. 18. This
model features the provision of direct transfers to the polity, funded by progressive
tax levy.
In sum, our computation analysis features four stylised modes of taxation, summa-
rized in Table 1.
We assess the impact of taxation over wealth inequality and mobility under these
stylised modes of taxation. For sake of simulation, we retain a tax rate τ = 0.05
for the proportional tax system and a maximum tax rate of τmax = 0.10 for the
progressive taxation. Under progressive tax regimes, this framework implies a tax-rates
structure that endogenously depends on the distributions of income (net wealth change)
and wealth and their evolution over time. Computational results (Figs. 9, 10) show
that all modes of taxation and redistribution are effective in reducing and stabilising
wealth inequality (Fig. 9, Left panel), while improving and stabilising wealth mobility
(Fig. 9, Right panel). Contrary to savings from labour income, taxation does effectively
introduce an alternative economic logic and a complementary economic process in our
miniature economy. This alternative and complementary collective action proves to be
effective in compensating the impact of financial accumulation over wealth inequality
and mobility.
In particular, Gini Index is consistently and materially inferior to the baseline case,
while it remains asymptotically far from one. Wealth mobility indicators are consis-
tently and materially superior to the baseline case featured by the Levy et al. model.
The actual relative impact on wealth inequality and mobility across modes of tax-
ation depends on the parameter space assumptions. Computational results (Fig. 10)
for mean tax and redistribution rates explain why progressive taxation is less effec-
tive than proportional taxation in reshaping wealth inequality and mobility, under our
framework of analysis. As mentioned above, individual tax rates under progressive tax
regimes depend on the underlying distribution of wealth. Since the latter is increasingly
right-skewed over time, this dependency involves a mean tax rate that progressively
becomes and remains very low over time (materially inferior to the mean tax rate of
0.05 applied under proportional tax regimes). Consequently, the impact of progressive
tax regimes over wealth inequality is materially reduced both in absolute terms, and
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Fig. 9 Left panel: Gini Index over time under baseline case (no taxation), proportional taxation and public
service model (Proportional and PS), proportional taxation and welfare model (Proportional and Welfare),
progressive taxation and public service model (Progressive and PS) and progressive taxation and welfare
model (Progressive and Welfare). Right panel: Weighted Mobility Index over time under the same cases.
Averages and standard deviations are computed out of 100 simulations. In all cases, initial wealth Wi,t=0 =
10 ∀i . See Sect. 6 for details about implementation of taxation and redistribution systems
relative to proportional tax regimes which apply an exogenous fixed tax rate. More-
over, since wealth distribution is increasingly and materially right-skewed over time,
a relatively low tax rate is sufficient to asymptotically stabilise the Gini Index (Fig. 9,
Left panel). Wealth is so concentrated on the top (see Lemma 1) that a relatively low
tax extraction from the richer is sufficient to materially increase wealth of the poorer,
involving a stabilising effect on wealth inequality over time (Fig. 10, Bottom panel).
This result does not establish preference for, or superiority of proportional tax regimes
over progressive tax regimes. In particular, the effectiveness of the proportional tax
system, while guaranteeing higher tax collection, neglects the regressive nature of
this tax mechanism. A policy implication of this result is that effectiveness of fiscal
systems depends on the underlying economic structure and process. Therefore, our
analysis would recommend tax authorities committed to progressive tax regimes to
maintain tax rate structures based on absolute wealth thresholds and independent from
relative wealth levels. The latter tax authorities should secure a sufficient degree of
progressiveness of taxation, as well as a sufficiently high top tax rates.
In conclusion, taxation materially reduces wealth concentration and inequality,
compensating the impact of financial accumulation process. Taxation proves therefore
to be effective in counterbalancing the inequality effects of the financial accumulation
process. This result is consistent with Fernholz and Fernholz (2014) arguing that “the
presence of redistributive mechanisms then ensures the stability of the distribution of
wealth over time”.
7 Concluding remarks
The poet Trilussa mocked national statistics to be that accounting method for which,
one individual having eaten two chickens and another one just none, both would result
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Fig. 10 Left panel: Mean Tax Rate over time under baseline case (no taxation), proportional taxation and
public service model (Proportional and PS), proportional taxation and welfare model (Proportional and
Welfare), progressive taxation and public service model (Progressive and PS) and progressive taxation and
welfare model (Progressive and Welfare). Right panel: Mean Redistribution rate over time under the same
cases. Bottom panel: Ratio between the total tax levied on the richest 50% of the population, relative to the
total wealth of the bottom 50% of the population. Averages and standard deviations are computed out of
100 simulations. In all cases, initial wealth Wi,t=0 = 10 ∀i . See Sect. 6 for details about implementation
of taxation and redistribution systems
to have eaten one chicken each.10 Students of income and wealth distributions may
keep this adage in mind while developing related macroeconomic models, especially
under the representative agent assumption.
Our computational economic analysis shows the significant connection between
inequality and the financial accumulation process in the study of income and wealth
distributions. This connection has been investigated through progressive extensions of
the baseline model introduced by Levy et al. Our analysis shows the limited heuristic
contribution of a two factors model comprising one single stock (capital wealth) and
one single flow factor (labour) as pure drivers of aggregate income and wealth genera-
10
“Me spiego: da li conti che se fanno \ seconno le statistiche d’adesso \ risurta che te tocca un pollo
all’anno: \ e, se nun entra nelle spese tue, \ t’entra ne la statistica lo stesso \ perchè c’è un antro che ne
magna due.” (Trilussa, La statistica).
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tion and allocation over time. We further show the theoretical contribution of minimal
institutions (à la Shubik), to partly overcome this limitation. In particular, we investi-
gate heuristic models of taxation in line with the baseline approach. Drawing upon our
computational economic analysis, we can infer that the financial accumulation pro-
cess plays a significant role as socioeconomic source of inequality, while institutional
configurations, including taxation, play another significant role in framing and shap-
ing the aggregate economic process that evolves over socioeconomic space and time.
Our computational economic analysis is based upon a simple modelling strategy com-
bined with a calibration that is suitable for comparing alternative model configurations.
This calibration does not necessarily fit empirical regularities. Therefore, we cannot
infer empirical or forecasting predictions, but rather theory-driven implications that
deserve further consideration from theoretical and applied viewpoints. Wealth inequal-
ity and mobility are important socio-economic dimensions of our economy and society.
Increased wealth inequality may raise fairness issues, undermining economic sustain-
ability and development through historical time. Decreased wealth mobility may raise
further fairness issues, undermining socio-economic incentives to entrepreneurship
and workmanship. Concerning wealth inequality and mobility issues, our computa-
tional economic analysis points to featuring drivers that deserve further attention by
researchers and policy-makers. First of all, the financial accumulation process appears
to be the key driver of both issues, generated by the peculiar compound return structure
that characterises financial investment in widespread institutional configurations. Its
contribution to wealth inequality and mobility further appears to fundamentally depend
on the financial market dynamics featuring volatility clustering and extreme events.
Labour income and savings do not appear to be able to rebalance the impact of this
financial accumulation process through historical time. Contrastingly, taxation appears
to be effective in compensating its effect. Finally, according to our computational eco-
nomic analysis, the causes of recent increases in wealth inequality may be sought in
socioeconomic transformations of financial market dynamics and taxation (including
fiscal niches exploitation, tax avoidance and the flattening of tax progressiveness) over
recent decades. From our theoretical perspective, return structure, volatility and exu-
berance in financial markets, as well as the working of fiscal systems are candidates
to drive wealth inequality and wealth mobility in our economy and society.
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Appendix
7.1 Proof of Lemma 1—Gini evolution for Compound Interest Structure
Proof We aim at proving that, for compound interest structure, Gt → 1 as t → +∞.
Our proof draws upon Fernholz and Fernholz (2014). Our model for compound
return structure replicates the background structure of the Fernholz and Fernholz
(2014) model, as represented by their Equation 10. Accordingly, with our notation:
Wi,t = Wi,t=1 · er(t) (20)
This equation denotes continuously compound return structure over time, with return
function r(t) depending on a standard Brownian motion. In this context, Fernholz
and Fernholz (2014)’s Theorem 2 proves that, if σr > 0, the time-averaged share of
total wealth held by the wealthiest single household converges to one, almost surely
(their Equation 13), although it is not the same household which maintains the leading
position over time. Analytically:
lim
t→+∞
∫ t
0
θmax,t (t)dt = 1 a.s.
with θi,t = Wi,t∑
t Wi,t
and where θmax,t = maxi [θi,t ].
Our model applies a discretely compound return structure as follows:
Wi,t = Wi,t=1
∏
(1 + ri,t )
Without loss of generality, this structure can be made continuous by making the
time change infinitesimal as follows:
Wi,t → Wi,t−1 · eR(t) with dt → 0 (21)
R(t) = ln(1 + ri,t ) (22)
where the R(t) function transforms our return ri,t from discrete to continuous
time. This formulation is analogous to Fernholz and Fernholz (2014) formula, since
ri,t ∼ N (μr ; σr ) by construction. Their proof applies then to it.
7.2 Proof of Lemma 3—Gini evolution for simple interest structure
Proof We aim at showing that, for simple interest structure, Gt → 0 as t → +∞.
The Gini Index tend to 0 if the wealth of all individuals tends to be equal for
t → +∞. By construction, ∀t
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Wi,t = Wi,1
(
1 +
∑
t
ri,t
)
The equality condition imposes that Wi,t = W j,t , thus:
Wi,1
(
1 +
∑
t
ri,t
)
= W j,1
(
1 +
∑
t
r j,t
)
or
Wi,1
(
1 +
∑
t
ri,t
)
− W j,1
(
1 +
∑
t
r j,t
)
= 0 (23)
Given that Wi,1 = W j,1 = W1, for each i, j by assumption (i.e., equal initial wealth
for all agents), Eq. 23 becomes:
W1 + W1
∑
t
ri,t − W1 − W1
∑
t
r j,t = 0 (24)
or simplifying:
W1
[
∑
t
(ri,t ) −
∑
t
(r j,t )
]
= 0
since r ∼ N (μr , σr ) by construction and since ∑ rh,t → t ·μr if t → +∞ ∀h = i, j ,
then:
W1
[
∑
t
(ri,t ) −
∑
t
(r j,t )
]
→ 0 for t → +∞
unionsq
Remark 1 The same result can be obtained if r has a distribution stably converging to
its mean μr for t → +∞
Remark 2 If we introduce heterogeneous initial distribution of wealth (that is, Wi,1 =
W j,1 for some i, j), it can be proved that the simple return dynamics tends to be neutral
on the initial ranking for t → +∞, that is, the initial ranking is maintained in the
long-run under the simple return structure (see also Biondi and Olla 2018).
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